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A Vision Of Somaliland - By: Ahmed M.I. Egal
March 23, 2008
During the last several months, it has become clear that the recognition of
Somaliland by the world is now on the cards. It seems that a ‘critical mass’ of
support among the international community for accepting the painfully
selfevident reality that Somaliland has made itself into a peaceful, mature,
stable and democratic state has won the day against the previous, ostrich-like
policy of senseless denial. The juridical argument that Somaliland won its
independence from Britain in 1960 and was a recognised nation-state before
joining with the Italian-administered UN Trust Territory to the south to form
the Republic of Somalia is true, and it certainly provides legal justification
for the recognition that is now in the offing. Nevertheless, the undeniable and
compelling rationale for recognising and supporting Somaliland’s nationhood is
simple: the people of this country have made for themselves, with no outside
help and indeed against the sustained efforts of regional powers in their
neighbourhood to undermine their efforts, a functioning, representative,
indigenous, democratic government.
The recent shift in the position of the United States in favour of a more active
engagement with Somaliland is certainly an important catalyst in mobilising
international support for Somaliland’s recognition. This is only to be expected,
after all in a uni-polar world, the blessing of the sole superpower is essential
for any significant, international, diplomatic undertaking. Many Somali and
foreign commentators have explained this recent shift in US policy with
reference to a
purported wish by the US Department of Defence (DOD) to base the newly created
Africa Command (AfriCom) in Somaliland’s port city of Berbera in the Gulf of
Aden. Of course, this argument gave rise to the usual chorus berating the
‘imperial’ motivation behind the America’s decision to engage Somaliland more
robustly and directly. However, the idea of basing AfriCom in Berbera seems very
far fetched, given Somaliland’s extremely poor level of infrastructure
development and lack of the necessary support services that such a facility
would require, e.g. housing, transportation, catering, fuelling facilities,
schooling etc.
A more reasonable explanation can be found with reference to several,
interrelated factors which directly impact upon US security concerns:
a) The failure of the so-called Transitional Federal Government of Abdillahi
Yusuf (TFG) to establish even the semblance of government in Mogadishu more than
a year after the Ethiopian army kicked out the Union of Islamic Courts and
installed the TFG in its place. Indeed, as Yusuf and his gang of war-criminal
thugs set about fighting over the aid monies pledged by the sponsors (including
the US) of their fictional government, the Ethiopians A Vision of Somaliland
Page 2 of 9 found themselves caught in a political and security quagmire with no
end in sight. As an increasingly ailing and aging Yusuf and his cohorts engaged
in their in-fighting, oblivious to the misery of the people they purportedly
represent, and as the isolated and poorly-trained Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu
became increasingly trigger-happy and indiscriminate in their response to the
natural hostility of the occupied Somali citizenry, it was inevitable that the
ousted UIC gained popular support in Mogadishu.
b) When the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia, many of the young, clanbased
fighters that had flocked to the UIC ranks at the height of its popularity
deserted, thus Ethiopia was able to take over the country with relative ease.
However, as the TFG showed its true colours by turning on itself over the spoils
of their beggary under the protection of an increasingly harsh and brutal
Ethiopian army that found itself in the midst of a sea of hostile, Somalis
united only in their opposition to the TFG and their Ethiopian protectors, the
young, clan-based fighters drifted back to the UIC. But the UIC itself had
fractured, with the moderate leadership of the home-grown Islamic Courts
movement ensconced in Asmara, while the radical, Al-Qaeda-inspired and trained
cadre that had seized leadership of the UIC had mutated into the Al-Shabab
Militia that now laid claim to the Al-Qaeda franchise in the Horn of Africa. It
was to this shadowy, violent and nihilistic organisation lead by Adan Hashi Ayro
that these young clan fighters gravitated and it is Al-Shabab that now poses the
most intractable and growing military threat to the TFG and the Ethiopian army.
c) By contrast, the authorities in Somaliland had demonstrated an effective
counter-terrorism capability which had the enthusiastic support and
participation of its people. In 2002, the Somaliland government arrested
eighteen armed ONLF guerrillas traversing its territory to undertake attacks in
Ethiopia and handed them over to Ethiopian authorities. In 2005, Somaliland
security forces succeeded in capturing and imprisoning the perpetrators of three
terrorist attacks which had resulted in the murder of several foreign aid
workers, including the English principal of Sheikh Secondary School and his
wife. In one incident, the residents of a small village some 40 miles from
Hargeisa arrested and detained two fleeing terror suspects which had engaged in
a gun battle in Hargeisa with Somaliland security forces prior to fleeing in a
commandeered vehicle.All these suspects were tried in criminal courts, and in
December 2006 fifteen suspects were sentenced to between 20 and 25 years in
prison. Only eight of the suspects had been apprehended in Somaliland and were
brought before the court, while the others, including Hassan Dahir Aweys and
Adan Hashi Ayro, were sentenced in absentia. In 2007 four other
suspects also linked to Aweys and Ayro (indeed one of the suspects was a brother
in-law of Ayro’s), were convicted of the murder of the English school principal
and his wife and executed after their appeals were exhausted. Thus, Somaliland
demonstrated its determination not to permit its territory to be used to mount
armed attacks against neighbouring countries, while also demonstrating its
security and intelligence capability to thwart terrorist operations mounted
against it by groups from Somalia. After the 2005 attacks against foreign aid
workers, the Somaliland government established a new, elite, paramilitary unit
to guard and protect foreign workers in the country and since that time, there
have been no further terrorist attacks against foreign workers and aid
organisations.
d) Finally, Somaliland’s success in creating a stable, peaceful country with
representative government, freedom of the press, freedom of association and the
rule of law under an independent judiciary, in a part of the world where such
freedoms are the exception rather than the rule, became increasingly impossible
to ignore. The US had conferred upon Ethiopia the responsibility to counter and
eradicate Al-Qaeda inspired or sponsored terrorist activity in the Horn of
Africa under the so-called global ‘war on terror’. With Ethiopia bogged down in
Somalia protecting a vile and venal cabal of warlords masquerading as a
government, and the concomitant rise of an increasingly effective Al-Shabab as
Al-Qaeda’s Horn of Africa franchisee, the US had to reassess its options.
Clearly, its policy of supporting the TFG in Somalia, while arming and
encouraging Ethiopia in its military campaign in support of the TFG was failing,
if not backfiring entirely.
These are the cold, hard, real-politik reasons behind the recent shift in US
policy in favour of a more active engagement with Somaliland and a more
objective understanding of the TFG’s inability to secure popular support in
Somalia and thereby undercut or eliminate Al-Shabab’s rise and possible
ascendancy in local politics. Of course, Berbera has a very strategic location
at the mouth of the Red Sea and it is a natural deep sea port capable of docking
the US Navy’s largest vessels, and its airport has the longest paved runway in
Africa. Thus, it is fairly certain the US Navy would like to use it. However, an
ideal location for AfriCom with all of its concomitant infrastructure and
communications requirements, it is certainly not.
Overlaying all the hard realities listed above is the argument, posed by this
writer among others, which posits that the road to a solution for the crisis in
Mogadishu lies through Hargeisa. This approach to solving the seemingly
intractable conflict in Somalia focuses upon an indigenous, bottom-up, grass
roots approach to reconciliation based upon Somaliland’s own experience, in
contrast to the top-down, foreign-sponsored approach that has proved such a
signal failure and resulted in the creation of illegitimate, Frankenstein-like
‘governments’ with little or no popular support such as the TFG, and the TNG
before it. It may well be that the international community, including the US, is
waking up to the benefits of this alternative approach, since their efforts to
date have failed miserably.
The Likely Impact of the State of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa. To get a
clear understanding of how Somaliland’s formal statehood will impact upon
regional politics in the Horn, it is necessary to understand its role and
history in Somali nationalism and the irredentist dream of Greater Somalia. It
is true to say that modern Somali nationalism, as with the nationalisms of much
of Africa, Asia, Arabia and Latin America, was the natural response to colonial
rule,since prior to European imperial entry into the Horn of Africa, there had
been no pan-Somali political structure or state. Instead Somalis were organised
economically and politically along clan and sub-clan lines with allegiances
shifting vertically depending upon lineage and horizontally depending upon
alliances, geographic proximity and marriage ties. The European carve-up of
Africa resulted in the Somali people being divided between the imperial powers
of Britain (British Somaliland Protectorate and the Somali-populated Northern
Frontier District of Kenya), Italy (Italian colony of Somalia), France
(Djibouti)
and Ethiopia (the Haud & Reserved Area which is now the 5th Governorate).
While some historians erroneously cite the anti-British campaign mounted by
Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan during the second decade of the 20th century as the
first manifestation of Somali nationalism1, the impetus to establish a modern
Somali state first emerged after the end of World War II when anti-colonial
nationalism swept across Asia and Africa. During the 1950s, there emerged within
all the Somali territories political movements agitating for independence and
self determination. In addition to this natural response to the nationalist
“wind of change” that was sweeping through Africa, the straight lines drawn by
the imperial powers in their carve-up of Africa artificially separated kith and
kin, not to mention water and pasturage from nomadic inhabitants that had used
them for millennia. This direct impact upon the lives and livelihoods of the
vast majority of the Somali population fuelled the nationalist impetus and
politicised the rural population. As was to be expected, Somali nationalism
quickly
developed an irredentist outlook which sought to unite all the Somali people in
one nation-state comprising the territories populated by them, and the dream of
Greater Somali was born.
1 In point of fact, Mohamed Abdille Hassan’s fight was as much tribal as it was
anti-British (or to be more accurate, anti-‘kafir’, i.e. non-Muslim, rule).
Abdille Hassan was from the Dulbahante sub-clan of the Darod people and he
wished to establish Darod hegemony in Somaliland and Somalia in which
territories the Darod were a minority. Thus, in his purportedly anti-kafir war,
he also fought the Isaaq in Somaliland and the Hawiye in Somalia, and it was his
inability to overcome the narrow tribal focus of his political aims that not
only lead to his eventual defeat, but which also negates the nationalist
characterisation that certain, biased historians attribute to him. In addition,
Abdille Hassan was anxious to instill his Salihiya school of Islamic thought
among Somali people which were, and remain, overwhelmingly adherents of Shafiya
school of Islam.
Nowhere did this dream of Greater Somalia have greater resonance and mass
adherence than in the British Somaliland Protectorate (BSP). This is explained
by several factors:
a) The population of the BSP was overwhelmingly rural with more than 90% of the
population comprising pastoral nomads roaming far and wide with their herds of
camels, sheep, goats and some cattle in a seasonal search for water and
pasturage. Conversely, the Italian colony to the south had a significant
agricultural sector with some 20% of the population comprising sedentary farmers
based in the fertile basin between the Juba and Shebelle rivers. In Djibouti,
there was a large minority (some 30%) of Afar people which are not Somali, thus
the irredentist impetus of the majority Somalis was somewhat muted. The
development of openly nationalist/irredentist political movements in the Haud &
Reserved Areas
in Ethiopia were muzzled effectively by the imperial regime in Addis, while the
irredentist yearnings of the Somalis in the NFD in Kenya was drowned out by the
violent campaign of the Mau Mau to evict Britain from Kenya.
b) The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II resulted in Italy being forced
by the UN to grant internal self-government to Somalia to prepare it for
independence within ten years. In addition, Italy had settled several tens of
thousands of Italian immigrants in the territory during the colonial period and
had effectively integrated it economy with Italy’s. Thus, the principal exports
from Somalia of bananas, some cotton and tropical fruits went to Italy while
nearly all imports came from Italy. In addition, Somalia was relatively
urbanised compared to other Somali territories due to the longstanding efforts
of Italy to settle the nomadic population through pacification efforts and the
provision of basic educational and medical facilities. By 1950, Somalia boasted
two large cities (by Somali standards) with populations numbering in the
hundreds of thousands, i.e.
Mogadishu and Kisimayo, and several urban, regional centres with populations in
the tens of thousands, e.g. Jowhar, Beledweyne, Bossasso, Merca etc. When the
pro-independence political parties emerged in the early 1950s, they paid lip
service to the dream of Greater Somalia, but in reality their energies were
focused upon the ‘real’ prize – ruling Somalia in
place of the Italians.
c) The ten years of UN Trusteeship provided Somalia with a decade of limited
self rule and, therefore, the development of a parliamentary political culture
focused upon the achievement of political power and the allocation of civil
service positions through patronage to maintain said power, along the Italian
model of multi-party democracy. Coupled with its comparatively developed
economy, not to mention greater levels of urbanisation and social infrastructure
(i.e. hospitals, schools, roads,
communications etc.), the allure of Greater Somalia was not as great in Somalia
as it was in the BSP, the Haud & Reserved Areas and the NFD. Indeed, nationalist
politics in the BSP was explicitly predicated in the popular mind upon the
creation of Greater Somalia. Independence from Britain was not seen as an
objective in itself, but as the first step towards the realisation of the dream
of Greater Somalia uniting all Somalis in one nation-state. The evidence of this
symbiotic linkage in the popular psyche between independence and the irredentist
dream was the public clamour within the newly independent Republic of Somaliland
for immediate,
unconditional unification with the UN Trust Territory when the first Prime
Minister suggested a period of six months to negotiate the terms of union.
This public pressure was so intense and evidenced by mass demonstrations, that
the government had no choice but to accede to the terms demanded by the new
government of Somalia, which were iniquitous to say the least, and effectively
deliver the BSP to Somalia.
When the terms of the union were put to a national referendum for ratification a
year later, in 1961, the overwhelming majority of people in the BSP rejected
them. The cold reality of the terms of the unequal union had triumphed over the
heady nationalism of the previous year.
Thus, it is fair to say that the BSP was the depositary of the irredentist dream
of Greater Somalia and the people of Somaliland were the keepers of its flame.
The brief border war between the new Republic of Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964
was actually instigated by Somalilanders unwilling to accept Ethiopian border
controls that sought to limit their rights to move freely in search of water and
pasturage as well as trade with their brethren across the border. A decade or so
later, when the dictator Siyad Barre invaded Ethiopia in 1977 to prop up his
increasingly shaky regime, it was Somaliland that became the front-line in that
war and it was the people of Somaliland that became caught up in the nationalist
fervour that accompanied the war, with young men volunteering to sign up and
women selling their jewellery to support the war effort. By contrast, in
Mogadishu and the rest of the south, life went on pretty much as before with the
population relatively immune to the nationalist hysteria gripping the north.
With the historic decision in 1991 to recover the sovereignty they had so
lightly surrendered in 1960 and re-establish their statehood, the people of
Somaliland turned a page in Somali history and, indeed, in the Horn of Africa.
This decision effectively killed the irredentist dream and laid the concept of
Greater Somalia to rest as the defining principle of Somali nationalism. The
dream of Somali unity had turned into a nightmare of tribalism, dictatorship and
genocide and the people of Somaliland are the first Somalis to clearly
understand this cruel lesson of history and face up to it. They have not built
their new Republic upon the heady, emotional call to ethnic solidarity, nor upon
the call for a theologically pure caliphate, but upon political liberty,
economic freedom, the rule of law and a separation of powers within government
to ensure that autocracy never again assumes ascendancy in their politics. The
fierce commitment of Somalilanders to their new Republic, their new nationalism
if you will, reflects their commitment to these founding principles and their
determination to never again relinquish that which they once easily gave away,
and were forced to recover after four decades of oppression through a long and
bloody war of liberation that forced one third of the population into exile
around the world.
Somaliland’s rejection of the dream of Greater Somalia also reflects acceptance
of historical reality, since the Somali peoples of Djibouti and the NFD of Kenya
had perforce surrendered their irredentist ambitions during the dark years of
the Siyad Barre dictatorship. There is an old Somali fable in which the
carnivorous animals of the bush had killed a deer to eat and the question of
apportionment of the meat had to be addressed. As King of the Beasts, the lion
instructed the hyena to divide up the carcass, and the hyena suggested that half
the meat should be given to the lion while the other half should be shared among
the other animals. The lion roared in displeasure and smote the hyena in the
head with his great paw dislodging one of his eyes which dangled bloodily down
his cheek. The lion then asked the fox to share out the meat and the fox
proposed that the meat be divided in half with one half set aside for the lion.
The other half would then be divided in half again with one half set aside for
the lion and so on and so on. The lion was mightily pleased with this share out
and asked the fox how it had learnt the art of apportionment, to which the fox
replied, “The eye of the hyena taught me”! Thus, did the Somali population of
Djibouti choose independent statehood over union with Somalia in 1977, after
witnessing what befell Somaliland after its ill-fated union with Somalia, most
particularly during the two decades of the Siyad Barre dictatorship which
culminated in the regime
declaring war on its own people and perpetrating genocide against the people of
Somaliland.
Regarding the Somali population of the 5th Governorate of Ethiopia, the federal
constitution enacted by the EPRDF government permits secession from Ethiopia if
the overwhelming majority of the people of any province vote for such in a free
and fair referendum. Indeed, it was this provision that provided for Eritrea’s
secession from Ethiopia and emergence as an independent country in 1993. The 5th
Governorate has an elected, regional legislature and representation in the
Federal Government in Addis Ababa, in fact its first Governor after the
overthrow of the Mengistu regime, Abdul Majid Hussein Omar, was a key member of
the EPRDF inner circle that fought in the war that deposed the Mengistu
dictatorship and installed a democratic, federal government in its place. The
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) that is fighting in the province is a
narrow, tribally based and defined organisation that remains wedded not only to
the failed irredentism of Greater Somalia, but also to the equally failed quest
for Darod hegemony within such a construct. They are the inheritors of Siyad
Barre’s disastrous quasi-fascist vision of tribal supremacy and they are
destined to join him in the dustbin of history.
Thus, the emergence of Somaliland as an independent country marks a crucial
watershed in the politics of the Horn of Africa which began with the overthrow
of the Mengistu and Siyad Barre dictatorships and the accession to independence
of Eritrea some eighteen years ago. This period ushered in a new era of popular
empowerment, representative government and the rule of law throughout the
region, with the singular exception of Somalia which descended into a hell of
warlord anarchy and state collapse. To be sure, the transition from dictatorship
to open and representative government has not been easy and the countries of the
region are struggling to get to grips with recognising the difference between
legitimate, political opposition and threats to the state, for example. However,
the fact remains that throughout the Horn, the era of dictatorship is certainly
over and there is both de jure and de facto recognition that the legitimacy of
the state derives from the willing consent of the people through government that
is both representative and accountable. Somaliland’s statehood will consign the
irredentist dream of Greater Somalia forever to the dark past, thereby removing
the last potential threat to the peaceful political and economic development of
this strategically crucial region.
Somaliland will be an invaluable addition to the region as an independent state
for many reasons, foremost among which are the following.
Firstly, Somaliland’s statehood will contribute immeasurably to resolving the
crisis in Somalia by demonstrating to the people of that country that the only
solution to their problems lies in their hands through national reconciliation
and the development of a new ‘xeer’ or social contract among themselves as to
how to live together.
Somaliland can and will provide a neutral and nurturing forum for the various
communities of Somalia to come together and resolve their differences.
Somaliland’s own experience in national reconciliation and conflict resolution
predicated upon Somali cultural and tribal traditions will bring a unique and
invaluable insight and utility that has been missing to date in international
efforts towards this end. The fact is that the ordinary people of Somalia, as
opposed to the coterie of warlord thugs that have held that country to ransom
for the last two decades, openly admire Somaliland’s achievements in national
reconciliation and nation-building, and wish the same for their own country.
Secondly, Somaliland’s accession to statehood will open the country to
foreign investment and will enable it to access international capital – both
commercial and discretionary. It will be possible to develop Berbera into a
major regional port serving the entire region and beyond, as far as Uganda,
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC). This will increase trade and
investment throughout East & Central Africa and so enhance economic growth and
development. Berbera could, and should, become a major trading hub and gateway
into East & Central Africa, and its strategic location as well as easy access to
the markets of Ethiopia and beyond stand in its favour in this regard.
Djibouti is presently developing a large container terminal in Doraleh, under
the aegis and management of Dubai Ports World (DPW) with the aim of serving this
same region. However, given the size of the target region in population
resources and geography, the economic growth rates beginning to be achieved
therein and the potential volume in trade concomitant therewith, there is a need
for both Berbera and Djbouti as world class ports. This is not a zero sum game
by any means and there will be greater demand than both ports can cope with, not
to mention the fact that healthy competition will benefit users by keeping rates
competitive.
In conclusion, the emergence of Somaliland as an independent nation-state is
not only the righting of a historical mistake (admittedly self-inflicted),
neither is it merely the recognition of the self evident, legally valid and
legitimate wish for self determination of the people of Somaliland, although it
is all of these things. In addition, Somaliland’s statehood is also an
important, and possibly key, chapter in the progress and development of the Horn
of Africa region towards representative government, economic growth and popular
empowerment. Denying the people of Somaliland their liberty and sovereignty
benefits no one and only provides aid and succour to those who look backwards
towards tribal hegemony or nihilism cloaked in faux religiosity for their
political credo. Conversely, embracing an independent Somaliland not only
recognises historical fact and the commendable achievements of the people of
that country,but also welcomes a mature and responsible partner to contribute to
the progress and development of the entire region.
Ahmed M.I. Egal
March 2008
egality@gmail.com
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